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Tuesday, June 14, 2011 - 01:06 SGT
Posted By: Gilbert

The Book of Changes (Part II)


Chapter Six - Election Rallies: Performances in Dissent, Identity, Personalities and Power

  • Election rallies are political performances unlike the mainstream media
  • Opposition rallies mostly attracted 5000 or more, with the WP pulling 20000 to 30000, while PAP ones generally got a few hundred to several thousand
  • Rally size was not seen as accurate reflection of voting patterns, though this is less so now
  • Opposition rallies tend to focus voter anger on perceived failings of the incumbents
  • Open dissent and defiance is however still rare outside of rallies
  • Impressive economic growth (14.5% in 2010) may have kept the PAP from recognizing the quiet desperation among low-income citizens
  • WP has kept its traditional base of young (now middle-aged) disenfranchised working-class Chinese men, further complemented by the better-educated
  • SDP rallies attracted the middle-class English-educated, artsy types, and liberals in general
  • The NSP's crowd was similar to the WP, plus Nicole Seah groupies
  • RP had a larger ethnic Indian following, attributed to the Jeyaretnam brand
  • (no comment on SPP/SDA)
  • PAP's public statment on the "Vincent video" seen as PAP smear
  • PAP had especially no strong or compelling personality, in contrast with the Opposition
  • PAP still maintains huge reach and power over the grassroots, using the Residents' Committees (RCs), which are officially non-partisan but in practice often close to the PAP
  • PAP could afford hired plastic chairs for its rallies, but often had to be staffed by elderly people persuaded by RC leaders, who organized the support by giving out whistles, plastic clappers, and pre-made placards [N.B. Can't help but think of the Chelsea plastic flag brigade here], not much spontaneity on show, most of the enthusiasm generated by a minority in the crowd
  • PAP was unlike the Opposition in not selling any paraphernalia, possibly both due to the lack of need to raise funds, and fear of defacement

Chapter Seven - Mainstream Media Reporting In The Lead-up To GE2011

  • Political blogs and SMSes technically banned during GE2006, but this ruling was largely ignored, and restrictions were eventually lifted for GE2011
  • Online reporting was responsible for forcing more unbiased/positive reports on the Opposition in the mainstream media
  • The Straits Times still commands a strong readership, and has put in place timely initiatives like Stomp
  • ST however communicates in a top-down, tightly-controlled and authoritarian manner
  • At least one ST article that played devil's advocate, noting among other factors the high property prices and surge in foreigners, which can help the Opposition
  • Influence of mainstream media is however waning
  • GE2011 however still not an internet election, but a multi-mediated one, with GE2016 expected to be similar

Chapter Eight - Shouting Down The PAP

  • Blogs continued to reflect truths ignored by the mainstream media, with The Online Citizen perhaps the best organized, but the Temasek Review (Emeritus) "mainly a gossip site whose appetite for interesting stories was unrestrained by either accuracy or taste"
  • Three major changes since GE2006: The arrival of Facebook, wide adoption of mobile internet devices, and easing of regulations on online campaigning
  • One main advantage of the PAP's incumbency is that it can influence newpapers and broadcasters, since these require government permits
  • SDP in particular used new media to bypass the unsympathetic official media
  • Erosion of traditional respect for authority, which while before had been confined to private space, now moved into semi-public space
  • Technology cannot however compensate for traditional resources like manpower
  • Netizens kept candidates on the straight and narrow by objecting to personal attacks
  • However, internet positions were generally entrenched and not arrived at by deliberation, which may be polarising

Chapter Nine - The Overseas Constituency

  • Over 180000 Singaporeans, about the size of Ang Mo Kio, live abroad, up from 36000 in 1990
  • WP's "First World Parliament" platform resonated with many overseas voters
  • Anti-foreigner rhetoric by the Opposition however might have alienated them
  • The same for PAP's questioning of returning Singaporeans (e.g. Mr. Chen Show Mao)
  • Overseas voting not always convenient - there are only nine places where ballots can be cast overseas: Canberra, Beijing, Hong Kong, London, New York, San Francisco, Shanghai, Tokyo and Washington DC, and for some (e.g. those in Perth) it is actually easier to return to Singapore to vote rather than travel to Canberra
  • No email alerts on voting were made to overseas Singaporeans, if they had not registered by the Elections Department beforehand
  • Overseas voters swayed by campaigning cannot vote if they had not registered before that
  • Four classes of overseas voters: Eventual Voters, who are both interested in politics and find it practical to vote, Aroused Voters who can vote conveniently but are not interested (and therefore likely did not register), Prevented Voters who are interested but unable to vote, and Not Interested Voters who don't care

Chapter Ten - The Voters Speak: Voices, Choices and Implications

  • The voice (will) of the people is paramount in both Eastern and Western political philosophies
  • GE2011 evidenced a 60-40 split, which was however not reflected in parliament due to the first-past-the-post system
  • Having most constituencies uncontested implies a weak political mandate and legitimacy crisis (happily avoided this time)
  • For the first time, opposition parties had candidates comparable to the PAP
  • Social science literature (Ronald Inglehart) predicts (true) democratisation after it attains affluence and a large middle class [N.B. However, is middle class shrinking?]
  • PAP candidates more cookie-cutter compared to the opposition's slate
  • PAP's famously stringent candidate selection process thrown into doubt, after recruitment of Ms Tin, who paled in comparism with Ms Seah (who would not have passed PAP's elitist screening)
  • Large winning margin in Aljunied reflected the deep resentment of the electorate, supposedly felt only at the last minute by the incumbents
  • The final outcome was quoted as "a calibrated and considered response from sophisticated voters"
  • PAP's electoral support did not dip below the psychological level of 60%
  • Voters prefer evolutionary over radical change
  • PAP is a victim of its own success and hubris
  • Demographics and the emergence of younger, more-educated voters means the PAP is unlikely to be able to stem the tide of change
  • Singapore has one of the highest Gini coefficients (measure of social inequality), 47.8 in 2009, compared with 37.6 in Japan and 41.5 in China
  • Huge influx of cheap foreign labour depresses wages of working class Singaporeans
  • Micro-theory of relative deprivation: when accumulation of individual frustration reaches a tipping point, demands for political change/collective action follows
  • Gerrymandering did not work in Aljunied, despite a portion being absorbed by Ang Mo Kio, and the addition of Kaki Bukit
  • Loss of Potong Pasir due to Mr Chiam's departure, and lack of a suitable replacement, also the inflow of new citizens
  • Joo Chiat GRC might have been lost had a chunk not been pushed to Marine Parade
  • Holland-Bukit Timah turned out not to be as tight as predicted, with the gay slur likely having some effect, and SDP's progressive tax policy probably backfiring with the wealthy [N.B. Interestingly, I have yet to hear anybody describe himself as rich, when discussing these proposals - perhaps there is always a richer guy out there], in addition to the lack of working the ground
  • The NSP might have won a GRC had it concentrated its best candidates, especially if against an unpopular minister

Chapter Eleven - 2011 General Election Snapshots

  • A collection of facts and trivia...


All the invited speakers were extremely comfortable on the microphone, with Harminder Pal Singh especially engaging.

A number of questions were fielded after the discussion, among which I recall one about the ministerial salary review committee (more of a statement than a question, actually), stating that it should come up for a referendum (unlikely).

Another was about relationships between the various Opposition parties, which brought uniformly bland and expected responses that they were willing to cooperate.

On regrets about standing for election, mostly none. The editors did rue at not being able to find somebody to look at the election from an economic/financial perspective, though.

Overall impression of the book: Although the chapters are written independently (as far as I can tell) by separate authors (almost all professors/researchers at local universities), they are all in broad agreement, with a number of observations and conclusions being repeated. This leads me to wonder if the analysis is as clear-cut as it is - I would certainly shell out another S$30 to read a (pro-)PAP version.

Shifting back into contrarian mode, is there a case to be made for 2011 to be a false dawn for the Opposition, as it was in 1991? Recall that the PAP got only 61% then, but managed to rebound to about 75% in a decade. Then-PM Goh put the dip down to being "open and consultative" (i.e. appearing weak) [N.B. this response was brought up by one of the speakers].

Might it be "it's the economy, stupid?" Data suggests no, with Singapore enjoying several years of over 10% growth in real GDP leading up to 1991, with things far rockier in the period before 2001 - it could well be that locals are more comfortable with exploring options when things are going well, but less willing to shake the boat in difficult times.

Therefore, a crisis might actually benefit the PAP - but it must be of a sort that they are perceived to have not had influence over (e.g. something like an externally-caused global depression would qualify, but not policies like those on immigration and flood control, or a likely local housing bubble, which our new Minister for National Development seems to have acknowledged publicly); the worst economic scenario for them would likely be a stagnation in wages/rise in cost of living that cannot convincingly be pinned on some cause that is clearly outside their purview.

On this subject, I found it noteworthy that not a few of my friends and acquaintances seem to have the impression that property is a fail-safe investment, and that only a lack of capital is stopping them from hitting it rich.

The general plan, which I believe has been mentioned in several Straits Times profiles of savvy investors, does not deviate much - cough up the down payment (pooling funds if necessary) on a condo/landed property, rent it out and use this income to (mostly) cover the monthly payments, and sit happily on a fully-paid-for and greatly-appreciated property a couple of decades down the road.

Clearly, this has worked here for quite some time, and has worked in many places, and at many times; however, whether it is completely foolproof is another thing. Increases in the price of housing outpacing that of wages cannot be sustained indefinitely, and social pressure is already beginning to rear its ugly head.

Furthermore, I (and evidently, quite a lot of others) suspect that the property boom is in large part driven by the population explosion, from 3 million in 1990, to 4 million in 2000, to over 5 million today - local or foreign, we all need a room of our own, no?

However, this rate of growth (which probably also drove our recent GDP increases. As Krugman wrote: "Singapore's growth has been based largely on one-time changes in behavior [e.g. doubling the population] that cannot be repeated...", "...all of Singapore's growth can be explained by increases in measured inputs. There is no sign at all of increased efficiency") can likely neither practically nor politically be maintained over anything but the short term.

I like humanity as much as the next man, but can't really see the PAP pulling off packing 8 million people here in 30 or 50 years, while remaining at the helm; I for one am eagerly awaiting what the government of the day can pull out of its hat once quantitative population growth has been maxed.

What now? Well, two milestones spring to mind: the result of the ministerial salary review (no fixed deadline), and the presidential election (by the end of August) - for the first, the PAP can be active, but for the other mostly reactive.

The new salary levels will inevitably be taken as a signal of how sincere the ruling party is in accommodating the populace. Actually, I for one am not against sky-high salaries... if we get the performance to match. I doubt too many would be bothered about the ministers raking in a few million a year, if we actually managed a Swiss standard of living. The problem is that having (by far) the best remuneration in the world naturally begets expectations of the best governance in the world, and public sentiment seems to be that we got merely "pretty good".

The way I see it, the PAP has three main routes open to them, whatever the recommendations (they do write their own cheques, after all): Firstly, they could go for minor tweaks to the current formula (by minor, I mean in the ballpark of a 10 to 20 percent cut), and hope that the issue dies a natural death, at least by the next election (due to this, if they take this option, I do not expect it to be taken before the presidential election)

While this would show a firm hand and forestall the perception of weakness by implicitly maintaining that they were (almost totally) in the right after all, I would put it as risky, especially if they do not plan to yield much on other policy directions; the Opposition would likely be able to flog it to great effect in five years.

Secondly, they could take a massive symbolic cut (50 per cent or more), which would go a long way towards appeasing the electorate (and to be frank, S$1 million down from S$2 million is still quite a packet). This would probably involve delinking ministerial pay from the Civil Service. Of course, figures in between (about 20% to 50%) are certainly possible, but seem neither here nor there to me, and may yield discontent while appearing indecisive.

Thirdly, the formula might be given a wholesale overhaul, and no longer be dependent on the top performers in the private sector, but to metrics like a fixed multiple of the salary of the median worker, as suggested by the Opposition (however, the PAP may be hesitant to use this particular measure as a major component, given its origin).

It's stick-neck-out time again, and my prediction as of now? The addition of feel-good care-for-the-little-guy factors in the salary formula, but which at current figures amount to about a 20% discount, and ride out the storm.

Actually, it is probably more likely that the PAP will wait until the presidential election is over, to get a second feel of the ground. It is, of course, possible that the election will be another walkover - but this really does them no favours, given that several credible candidates (albeit all with PAP connections) have presented themselves.

My take? Despite still considering it, I feel that our present President is quite unlikely to throw his hat in the ring for various reasons. The more interesting question is whether the PAP will push (subtly, or not-so-subtly) any particular candidate. Personally, I would think no, as they would have more to lose than gain from that - which would be another breakthrough in itself.

If it shapes up to be a three-way between our former Foreign Minister, Mr. Yeo, and Dr. and Mr. Tan, I would expect Mr. Yeo to take it with something like a 50-30-20 share, all things considered. He has a wellspring of sympathy to draw upon, a certain respect among many Opposition voters, and a higher profile. He has set himself two weeks (only one of those remaining) to make a decision, and my guess is that the decision will be yes.

If Mr. Yeo does not run, I would expect it to be a toss-up among the remaining candidates. While the level of support for a clearly non-PAP affiliated candidate would shed a lot of light on the current mood, I do not expect any such candidate to make it through the application process, more's the pity.



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Related Posts:
The Book of Changes (Part I)
Aftermaths
The Issue Issue
Mini Bites
A Voting Time Save Mine
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